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Bollettino definitivo della II guerra mondiale:
-24.400.000 soldati
-30.917.000 civili
per un totale di 55.317.000 morti;
perso il computo dei mutilati.
Incalcolabili i costi bellici, infrastrutturali e sanitari, dalle proporzioni mostruose.

Di' la verità, questa guerra qui, per il suo felice esito (la fine di Hitler), t'ha fatto meno schifo?

Per sapere.

Bisogna aggiungere : la fine di Hitler e l'inizio di Stalin. A proposito, paradossalmente bisogna ringraziare i russi (sto parlando del sacrificio del popolo russo non del baffone) se Hitler ha cominciato il ritiro. La prima vera sconfitta fu quella subita dal generale Von Paulus a Volgograd (già Stalingrado) nell'inverno 1942-1943. Da lì Hitler iniziò la sua fine.
E tra l'altro si tende a dimenticare il crimine delle due bombe atomiche (moltissime persone continuano a morire ancora oggi per quell'esplosione) che colpirono un Giappone già moribondo e che aveva già chiesto la resa.
Un'altra cosa : la situazione storica è totalmente diversa (tra l'altro molto complessa e trattata spesso sbrigativamente) e anche le parti sono invertite. L'aggressore ,con buona pace di chi tira in ballo la scusa dell' 11 settembre , su cui peraltro pende l'ombra seria del complotto, sono gli "esportatori della democrazia".
Alla larga da certi import-export !

Yusuf

Fermi, signori. Io ero contrario alla guerra irachena, ma per ragioni di opportunità, non di principio. Esportare la democrazia è compito ammirevole e necessario, e in alcune circostanze non lo si può fare se non abbattendo con le armi regimi tirannici. La campagna irachena NON rientrava in queste circostanze, ma il principio resta.
Specifichiamo inoltre che l'aggredito non è stato il popolo iracheno ma il regime di Saddam (in caso di dittature, l'equivalenza tra governanti e governati va a farsi friggere), e che della risibile ombra del complotto settembrino me ne fo baffo.

Yusuf, sotto i tuoi piedi dovresti trovare numerosi macigni da tirare alla Grande Meretrice, nonché adultera. Vedi un po'.
Tira va', aiutati con la TRAVE oculare.

Quanto ai milioni di morti, non preoccuparti troppo, cara Rubino Martedì: tra poco le forze della democrazia sganceranno le loro atomiche sull'Iran (è da ottobre 2004 che la minaccia è concreta), e così avrai modo di ripensare un attimo ai tuoi numeretti.

Sì, sì, "Duce", mo' me lo scrivo.

Yusuf, il diligente indottrinato, dimentica che l'URSS era alleata del Terzo Reich (patto Molotov-Ribbentrop) e che, quindi, più che il popolo russo, bisogna ringraziare la follia di Hitler che ruppe il patto pensando di poter sostenere la guerra su due fronti.
Quanto alle bombe atomiche sul Giappone, fermo restando l'orrore (che, come fanno i bravi storici, non useremo a fini di bassa propaganda politica melodrammatica), preme ricordare che il Giappone non aveva chiesto la resa e che, anzi, si era rifiutato di firmarla in quanto "incondizionata", temendo che una simile umiliazione potesse comportare la fine della monarchia imperiale.
Infine, "l'ombra del complotto" dell'11 settembre è, fatti alla mano e fantasie da un'altra parte, solo un problema cerebrale di taluni che sarebbe bene diagnosticare una volta per tutte mediante TAC o Risonanza magnetica.
Yusuf, torna a settembre (dell'anno prossimo).

Bernardo

Il grave del momento attuale è proprio questo : ruby e bernardo, ne sono sicuro, sono due bravissime persone che rendono onore alla Casa di Dio . Non ho dubbi su questo ! Piene di buone intenzioni , e non intenzionate a lastricare le strade dell'inferno. Eppure, non dico adesso, ma fra 10, 20 , 30 anni , forse 70 come nel caso dell'URSS , si accorgeranno che hanno appoggiato un sistema criminale e menzognero. Si badi bene : questo NON E' ASSOLUTAMENTE un giudizio sulle persone.
Mi ricordo 30 anni fa quando in pieno regime brezneviano distribuivo con altri amici i documenti del Samizdat. Noi per primi eravamo consapevoli che non era facile far capire quello che accadeva nel blocco comunista. E quando non ci rovesciavano i banchetti eravamo stigmatizzati , soprattutto da molti cattolici, che devo tristemente constatare sono (anzi siamo visto che cattolico sono anch'io) i più facilmente buggerabili.
Un amico prete disse in una predica che lo spiritualismo ha dato un colpo mortale alla Chiesa (si fa per dire perchè la Chiesa non morirà mai).
Don Baget Bozzo , che spesso non condivido, ma ha lampi geniali che non possono che venire dallo Spirito Santo disse che attualmente il demonio è spiritualista (30 anni fa era materialista).
Il Papa , nel discorso a Regensburg , rivolto soprattutto al mondo protestante, parla dei rischi di un cristianesimo sola fide , non incarnato e quindi non ragionevole, disellenizzato.
Da buon santo profeta come credo fermamente sia , Papa Benedetto XVI se ne è accorto e lo denuncia. Ma lo comprenderemo solo fra decenni temo.
Attenzione però ! Paul Tibbets , il criminale di guerra americano che sganciò la bomba atomica su Hiroshima (non so se sia ancora vivo, lo era l'anno scorso) ad 89 anni, 60 anni dopo il fatto, dichiarò di essere ancora e pienamente convinto della giustezza morale del suo gesto e che lo avrebbe tranquillamente rifatto (tra l'altro era l'unico dell'equipaggio dell'Enola Guy a sapere cosa sarebbe successo). Questo non per giudicarlo (sarà Dio a farlo), ma per dire che il tempo , che ci è stato dato per incontrare Cristo , lo possiamo ostinatamente gettare via ed anche 60 anni possono non bastare. Comunque il tempo è galantuomo e la Verità, grazie a Dio, è testarda !
Che la Madonna ci aiuti !

Yusuf

Amen, Yusuf.
Se può farti dormire meglio, ti assicuro che chi pensasse di disellenizzarmi intraprenderebbe un'impresa senza speranza. Almeno quanto quella di chi volesse spiegarti cosa Benedetto XVI ha detto davvero a Regensburg.

Saluti,

Bernardo

Yusuf, la linea di interpretazione storica da te sostenuta è, anche se plausibile, minata e resa inservibile da una serie di presupposti che mi sento di definire "ideologici". La storia non si interpreta, si studia.
"Criminale" l'uso dell'atomica? Non mi risulta che, in qualsiasi guerra, da Achille in poi, quello dei contendenti che fosse in possesso di un'arma più potente abbia mai rinunciato a usarla. E, oltre alle ragioni già ricordate da Bernardo, mi sembra il caso di rilevare che, con ogni probabilità, furono proprio le atomiche giapponesi a evitare il conflitto armato (che sarebbe stato "definitivo") tra URSS e occidente. Ragione politica: forse non sufficiente, ma il giudizio mi sembrerebbe ingeneroso.
C'è poi un altro aspetto, del quale non si tiene mai conto: qualsiasi generale, potendo risparmiare la vita di un SUO soldato, non esiterà a sterminare diecimila nemici. Così, in un'ottica di guerra (nella quale, è bene ricordare, i valori dell'etica si scontrano spesso: uccidere non è mai lecito, ma assassinare Hitler sarebbe stao un "male"?), ritengo -mia opinione, eh- che l'uso dell'atomica (così come, mutatis mutandis, il bombardamento di Dresda; che, tra l'altro, fu voluto, progettato ed effettuato dagli inglesi, anche se certi pacifisti a senso unico spacciano gli americani per colpevoli: ah, la scuola...) fosse, ancorché terribile, lecito e giustificato.
Ora, questa è, come la tua, appunto, un'opinione, di matrice etica: sulla quale si può sì costruire un "giudizio storico", ma non un "pregiudizio" (che è quello che tristemente accade in tante occasioni proprio contro i cattolici e la Chiesa). Il che vuol dire che una "condanna", così come una "assoluzione", non possono assurgere ad assolutezza ed eternità, così che le colpe dei padri ricadono sui figli...
Che il demonio sia oggi spiritualista, non mi sorprenderei: non sarebbe una novità, e come è noto, una delle caratteristiche del demonio è quella di girare in tondo (senza senso nè prospettiva di sviluppo), e tornare sempre lì da dove era partito...

Ribadisco, confortato nelle mie ragioni dai due ultimi interventi, quanto sia importante l'interpretazione dei dati, anche nello studio della storia.
Mi permetto solo di ricordare a mo' di esempio che una delle domande del "questionario" a cui bisognava rispondere per entrare nella GEheime StAats POlizei era "saresti disposto a sacrificare la vita di una persona per salvarne un milione ?"
O per citare un esempio neotestamentario i farisei (non a caso chiamati da Gesù ipocriti (che recitano) dicono tra di loro quando hanno deciso di far fuori Cristo "E' meglio che muoia un uomo solo piuttosto che un intero popolo". Ed in effetti il Figlio di Dio è stato sacrificato per salvare l'umanità intera, ma con un piccolo particolare : Lui ha aderito alla Volontà del Padre con piena libertà . Paul Tibbets , moderno fariseo-ipocrita con tanto di medaglia d'oro (oro maledetto per quanto mi riguarda) , non ha chiesto il permesso agli abitanti di Hiroshima, mi risulta.

Yusuf

Mi fai ridere, Yusuf.
Tu non interpreti i dati, tu menti, manipoli i fatti per legittimare un preconcetto ideologico.
Quando scrivi, per esempio, che "si tende a dimenticare il crimine delle due bombe atomiche che colpirono un Giappone già moribondo e che aveva già chiesto la resa", dici una falsità tout court. C'è poco da interpretare.
Il Giappone (che, ricordiamolo, aveva provocato la guerra) aveva rifiutato di arrendersi (i generali, per la verità, non volevano farlo neppure dopo le due esplosioni nucleari) e lo Stato Maggiore americano aveva messo al corrente il Presidente che l'occupazione territoriale militare del Giappone - l'unica alternativa possibile - sarebbe costata un anno di guerra in più e un numero di morti americani quantificabile in diverse centinaia di migliaia di soldati (alcune stime parlavano addirittura di un milione). E' del tutto naturale che Truman abbia fatto quella scelta: lui era il "comandante in capo" e, come ha scritto BBSlow, ogni comandante DEVE preferire la vita di uno solo dei suoi a quella di diecimila nemici. Sarà tragico finché vuoi ma è la guerra. La stessa guerra che richiede l'uso delle armi più innovative senza troppi scrupoli di coscienza: da Alessandro Magno ai romani, da Napoleone a Bismarck la regola è sempre stata questa (una regola ovvia, d'altra parte). Usare l'orrore che è giusto provare per la guerra in sé e per le sue devastazioni con malizia ideologica, per creare il "grande Satana", il colpevole per eccellenza, è però un'altra cosa: si chiama malafede, propaganda, storiografia etica, e con la storia non ha davvero nulla a che fare.
Ora, che tu ritenga di poter cavalcare la bufala del complotto dell'11 settembre per delegittimare la reazione americana e assolvere l'amico beduino rientra a pieno titolo in questa subcultura ideologica ma non ti getta ancora nel ridicolo assoluto grazie alla struttura "fluida" del sistema dell'informazione nell'epoca del villaggio globale, ma quando esageri manipolando dati storici noti e accertati in modo tanto disinvolto scopri il tuo gioco e delegittimi ogni tua affermazione, giusta o sbagliata che sia.

Bernardo

Il 12 maggio, quattro giorni dopo la fine della guerra in Europa, il rappresentante giapponese in Svizzera, Shunichi Kase, fece sapere a William Donovan, direttore dell’Ufficio servizi strategici, che il suo governo sperava di «trovare un accordo che permettesse di cessare le ostilità». Era il primo dei numerosi segnali di trattativa lanciati dai nipponici agli Alleati. E recenti documenti rivelano che l’ecatombe di Hiroshima e Nagasaki poteva essere evitata: il delirio di onnipotenza degli scienziati, il cinismo degli Alleati, la corsa al bottino tra Usa e Urss resero vani i tentativi diplomatici. Le dò un sito dove può leggere qualche cosa in proposito. Fra i tanti ho scelto , non a caso , un articolo tratto da Il Manifesto : credo difatti che un suo problema sia la mancanza di metodo e di apertura mentale che le impedisce di accettare che lo Spirito soffia dove vuole e questo rende meno liberi oltre che meno intelligenti : http://www.comedonchisciotte.org/site/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1266
Riguardo al resto delle sue affermazioni sinceramente non mi fanno ridere e al contrario di lei mi intristiscono. Forse perchè la mia famiglia ha sperimentato sulla sua pelle cosa significhi la guerra , la morte, la distruzione, l'umiliazione.

Yusuf

Lasci stare lo Spirito, che è argomento serio.
Quanto al "Manifesto" lo compro solo per pulire i vetri dell'auto, avendone scoperto la straordinaria resistenza ai detergenti.
Caro amico, dei suoi "si dice" e dei "recenti documenti che farebbero pensare che", io ne faccio ciò che è giusto e che, per rispetto dei gentili ospiti, le lascio intuire soltanto.
Coi sospetti e le allusioni è possibile alimentare qualsiasi versione dei fatti: la teoria dei complotti può facilmente essere rovesciata su chi la fa, dal momento che si tratta di un metodo molto duttile. Storicamente chi si è servito della tesi della grande macchinazione era poi il vero farabutto.
La pseudocultura dei pettegoli che vorrebbero attribuire dignità di verità alle loro paranoie e alle loro malizie ideologiche non m'interessa.

Bernardo

Prima informarsi, poi giudicare. Cordiali saluti. R. Buffagni

This material has been provided by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Why the atom bomb wasn't necessary to end the war

By Janet Bloomfield, Chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
I believe that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when considered in a historical perspective, were undoubtedly unnecessary and barbarous acts. Those who support this view include Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery and General Dwight Eisenhower. I would ask the following questions of those who still support the bombings:

Why was there no demonstration explosion in an uninhabited area to convince the Japanese of the awesome power of the bomb?

Why was it necessary to bomb two cities?
During the pause for thought that these questions invoke I will use the words of others, involved at the time, as well as evidence that has come to light since, which prove that:

"Japan was at that very moment seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'... It wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing." (General Eisenhower).

First, let us stop for a minute and remember the impact of the atomic bombs.

The uranium bomb exploded over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and the plutonium bomb used on Nagasaki on 9 August killed tens of thousands instantly and had claimed 350,000 lives by 1950. Those not killed or vaporised immediately by the blast were horribly burned by the intense heat of the explosion. Eye-witness accounts describe traumatised people wandering with their skin trailing from their bodies 'like walking ghosts'. All recorded pregnancies within a two-mile radius of the centre of the blast resulted in miscarriage or stillbirth. Even today, survivors live with the fear that they may be struck down by a radiation-related disease.

We now know that the allies were aware by May 1945 that the Japanese were attempting to make contact in order to negotiate a surrender and that Japan was being overcome by conventional might. According to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Truman's Chief of Staff:

"The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons... In being the first to use it [the atomic bomb], we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages."


April: General Curtis le May (US Air Force) expressed a belief that the war could be ended by September or October without an invasion.

May 12: William Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Studies, reported to President Truman that Shuichi Kate, Japan's Minister to Switzerland, wished to "help arrange for a cessation of hostilities."

Mid-June: "A surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provision for America's defense against future trans-Pacific aggression." Admiral W.D. Leahy, President's Chief of Staff.

July 16: The US exploded a nuclear bomb secrety in the New Mexico desert to prove to themselves that it would work.

July 18: Stalin told Truman that he had had a telegram from the Japanese Emperor himself asking for peace. Code-breakers were already aware of this. The Soviet Union was still officially neutral at that time.

August 10: The Japanese publicly broadcast an offer of surrender. Truman ordered conventional military operations to continue full force.

August 14: The Japanese surrender was accepted.
"It would be a mistake to suppose that the fate of Japan was settled by the atomic bomb. Her defeat was certain before the first bomb fell." (UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill.)

"Certainly prior to 31 December 1945... Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated." (US Strategic Bombing Survey, 1946.)

If Japan was ready to surrender, there must have been another reason for the atom bombs to have been used. This, unbelievable as it might seem, was to make a point to the Soviet Union.

Vannevar Bush (Chief Aide for atomic matters to Stimson, the Secretary of State for War) confirmed this when he said that the bomb was: "delivered on time so there was no necessity for any concessions to Russia at the end of the war."

The US did not want the Soviet Union to be involved in the anticipated 'last push' land invasion of Northern China, since this would put it in a good position to exert influence in the area once hostilities ceased. The US therefore attempted to end the fighting before the Red Army entered Chinese territory but did not accept Japanese moves to surrender, leaving President Truman confident about finishing the war in the Far East with as little help from Russia as possible.

Truman postponed meeting Churchill and Stalin to discuss post-war territorial control until after July 16, when the first ever atomic explosion took place as the US tested its new weapon in New Mexico. Truman went to Potsdam, Germany, the very next day buoyed by the conviction that he had a weapon which would, as predicted by his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, "make Russia more manageable in Europe."

The Hiroshima bomb was dropped on 6 August. The message to the Japanese must have been unmistakable and it is difficult to imagine why a second one should have been used on August 9. Except that the Soviet Union was due to enter the war in that week and the US wanted to demonstrate to the Soviets the awesome power that they would be dealing with once the war was over.

In part because he wanted to wait until the bomb was ready, President Truman ignored advice in May 1945 from Acting Secretary of State Grew that changing the surrender terms might well halt the fighting. Some came to believe that this actually cost lives. Stimson, Secretary of State for War, said: "History might find that the US, by its delay in stating its position, had prolonged the war."

It is clear that 50 years on, the existing mythology must be questioned and a more sober assessment of the facts is needed. The need for this has been brought sharply into focus by the latest twist in the Arms Trade race.

For the past few years there has been a general impression that there is no longer a nuclear threat. This, alas, is far from the truth. Whilst the US and Russia take tentative steps towards a build-down, France, China and the UK are increasing their arsenals. The British Government has stated that the new Trident nuclear warheads will be used for targeting non-nuclear states. The French decision to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific in September threatens to unleash a new wave of nuclear proliferation, since the only reason to test is to develop new nuclear weapons. It may cause the breakdown of talks in Geneva towards a complete nuclear test ban, an important step on the road to disarmament.



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All those who suffered in the war were victims of a world gone mad. CND is working to make sure that the nuclear madness is reversed and that the nuclear weapon states honour their international commitment to nuclear disarmament, reaffirmed in May at the UN.

To support CND's campaign to stop further French nuclear tests, get nuclear warheads off Britain's roads and stop the Government spending 3m per day on nuclear weapons, contact us on + 44 (0)171 700 2393 or write to me at 162 Holloway Rd, London N7 8DQ.

Un consiglio a caldo su come usare la bomba e vivere felici, a cura di Bertrand Russell.

Bertrand Russell: A Hypertextual Draft Edition of a Paper from Volume 22




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The Russell Editorial Project is offering an electronic version of an edition-in-progress of Russell's first anti-nuclear writing. The electronic version has the full range of hypertext capabilities woven into the traditional Collected Papers structure of headnote, chronology, text, annotation, textual notes, bibliographical index, and illustrations.

Russell's paper is called "The Bomb and Civilization" and was written in 1945. The editor of this paper, which is scheduled to be in Volume 22, is Kenneth Blackwell. Let him know of any errors, and if you find the hypertext apparatus at all infelicitous. A conventional view of the headnote and paper as they would be printed in the typeface of the edition is available in pdf format. This view is searchable, saveable, and printable.

This article, as Dr. Blackwell states in the headnote, is Russell's first response to the news of the devastation caused by the first atomic bomb. Though written hurriedly, and in a frantic moment of history, it announces themes that will dominate Russell's political programme for years to come. The article announces the urgency of the search for a structure of world peace, and it reiterates his faith in scientific progress and his hope that the United States will assume leadership in creating the global structures that are necessary for the survival of the human race. Russell's mood is one which combines the composure of the sage and the panic of the prophetic Cassandra. As a man of science he wishes to reassure the public concerning the scientific achievement. He advises his readers that "The atomic bomb embodies the results of a combination of genius and patience as remarkable as any in the history of mankind," that the men whose work made this bomb possible were for the most part "both high-minded and public spirited" and finally that we should not look upon the bomb as a punishment "for impiety in inquiring too closely into the hidden secrets of nature". On the contrary he reaffirms his faith that "Science is capable of conferring enormous boons".

But the panic is equally vivid. Russell is clearly convinced that now that the weapon has been unleashed, a war for the possession of uranium is almost inevitable. Even before the war has ended, Russell is convinced of the outbreak of rivalry between the wartime Allies, the United States and the Soviet Union. He is convinced that another war is inevitable. After proposing and then dismissing the alternative of a Hobbesian contract in which all the nations of the world surrender their power and constitute a world government, or the next best solution, an American putsch in which, armed with the only available atomic weapons, the government of the United States will set up a world government by force (a programme which he advocated since the closing stage of the First World War), he ends with the hope that after the next world war "some Power will emerge with such preponderant strength as be able to establish a peaceful hegemony over the rest of the world". The article raises a number of questions which visitors to our Website may want to discuss on Russell-l.

Louis Greenspan
Director



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able of Contents
Headnote
Chronology
"The Bomb and Civilization" (1945)
Annotation
Textual Notes
Bibliographical Index




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he Bomb and Civilization (1945)
It is impossible to imagine a more dramatic and horrifying combination of scientific triumph with political and moral failure than has been shown to the world in the destruction of Hiroshima. From the scientific point of view, the atomic bomb embodies the results of a combination of genius and patience as remarkable as any in the history of mankind. Atoms are so minute that it might have seemed impossible to know as much as we do about them. A million million bundles, each containing a million million hydrogen atoms, would weigh about a gram and a half. Each hydrogen atom consists of a nucleus, and an electron going round the nucleus, as the earth goes round the sun. The distance from the nucleus to the electron is usually about a hundred-millionth of a centimetre; the electron and the nucleus are supposed to be so small that if they could be crowded together it would take about ten million million on end to fill a centimetre. The nucleus has positive electricity, the planetary electron an equal amount of negative electricity; the nucleus is about 1850 times as heavy as the electron. The hydrogen atom, which I have been describing, is the simplest of atoms, but the atom used in the atomic bomb is at the other end of the scale.

Uranium, the element chiefly used in the atomic bomb, has the heaviest and most complex of atoms. Normally there are 92 planetary electrons, while the nucleus is made up of about 238 neutrons (which have mass without electricity), 238 positrons (which have positive electricity and very little mass), and 146 electrons, which are like positrons except that their electricity is negative. Positrons repel each other, and so do electrons; but a positron and electron attract each other. The overcrowding of mutually attracted and expelled particles in the tiny space of the uranium nucleus involves enormous potentially explosive forces. Uranium is slightly radioactive, which means that some of its atoms break up naturally. But a quicker process than this is required for the making of an atomic bomb.

Rutherford found out, about thirty years ago, that little bits could be chipped off an atom by bombardment. In 1939, a more powerful process was discovered: it was found that neutrons, entering the nucleus of a uranium atom, would cause it to split into two roughly equal halves, which would rush off and disrupt other uranium atoms in the neighbourhood, and so set up a train of explosions so long as there was any of the right kind of uranium to be encountered.

Ever since the beginning of the war, the Germans on the one side, and the British and Americans on the other, have been working on the possibility of an atomic explosive. One of the difficulties was to make sure that it would not be too effective: there was a fear that it might destroy not only the enemy, but the whole planet, and naturally experiments were risky. But the difficulties were overcome, and now the possibility, which scientists have foreseen for over forty years, has entered into the world of practical politics. The labours of Rutherford and Bohr, of Heisenberg, and Schrödinger, and a number of other distinguished men, the ablest men of our time, and most of them both high-minded and public-spirited, have borne fruit: in an instant, by means of one small bomb, every vestige of life throughout four square miles of a populous city has been exterminated. As I write, I learn that a second bomb has been dropped on Nagasaki.

The prospect for the human race is sombre beyond all precedent. Mankind are faced with a clear-cut alternative: either we shall all perish, or we shall have to acquire some slight degree of common sense. A great deal of new political thinking will be necessary if utter disaster is to be averted.

For the moment, fortunately, only the United States is in a position to manufacture atomic bombs. The immediate result must be a rapid end to the Japanese war, whether by surrender or by extermination. The power of the United States in international affairs is, for the time being, immeasurably increased; a month ago, Russia and the United States seemed about equal in warlike strength, but now this is no longer the case. This situation, however, will not last long, for it must be assumed that before long Russia and the British Empire will set to work to make these bombs for themselves. Uranium has suddenly become the most precious of raw materials, and nations will probably fight for it as hitherto they have fought for oil. In the next war, if atomic bombs are used on both sides, it is to be expected that all large cities will be completely wiped out; so will all scientific laboratories and all governmental centres. Communications will be disrupted, and the world will be reduced to a number of small independent agricultural communities living on local produce, as they did in the Dark Ages. But presumably none of them will have either the resources or the skill for the manufacture of atomic bombs.

There is another and a better possibility, if men have the wisdom to make use of the few years during which it will remain open to them. Either war or civilization must end, and if it is to be war that ends, there must be an international authority with the sole power to make the new bombs. All supplies of uranium must be placed under the control of the international authority, which shall have the right to safeguard the ore by armed forces. As soon as such an authority has been created, all existing atomic bombs, and all plants for their manufacture, must be handed over. And of course the international authority must have sufficient armed forces to protect whatever has been handed over to it. If this system were once established, the international authority would be irresistible, and wars would cease. At worst, there might be occasional brief revolts that would be easily quelled.

But I fear all this is...

Che cosa ne pensava uno che la bomba l'ha fatta.

UP to Atomic Bomb: Decision
UP to Leo Szilard Home Page
Leo Szilard, Interview: President Truman Did Not Understand
An authorized web-reprint of the full text of
"President Truman Did Not Understand,"
U.S. News & World Report, August 15, 1960, pages 68-71.

Created: January 26, 1996
URL: http://www.peak.org/~danneng/decision/usnews.html


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Copyright, August 15, 1960, U.S. News & World Report.



President Truman Did Not Understand
Dr. Leo Szilard, 62, is a Hungarian-born physicist who helped persuade President Roosevelt to launch the A-bomb project and who had a major share in it. In 1945, however, he was a key figure among the scientists opposing use of the bomb. Later he turned to biophysics, and this year was awarded the Einstein medal for "outstanding achievement in natural sciences."
At NEW YORK
Q Dr. Szilard, what was your attitude in 1945 toward the question of dropping the atomic bomb on Japan?

A I opposed it with all my power, but I'm afraid not as effectively as I should have wished.

Q Did any other scientists feel the same way you did?

A Very many other scientists felt this way. This is particularly true of Oak Ridge and the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago. I don't know how the scientists felt at Los Alamos.

Q At the Oak Ridge and Chicago branches of the A-bomb project, was there any division of opinion?

A I'll say this: Almost without exception, all the creative physicists had misgivings about the use of the bomb. I would not say the same about the chemists. The biologists felt very much as the physicists did.

Q When did your misgivings first arise?

A Well, I started to worry about the use of the bomb in the spring of '45. But misgivings about our way of conducting ourselves arose in Chicago when we first learned that we were using incendiary bombs on a large scale against the cities of Japan.

This, of course, was none of our responsibility. There was nothing we could do about it, but I do remember that my colleagues in the project were disturbed about it.

Q Did you have any knowledge of Secretary of War Stimson's concern at this time on the question of using the bomb?

A I knew that Mr. Stimson was a thoughtful man who gave the bomb serious consideration. He was one of the most thoughtful members of the Truman cabinet. However, I certainly have to take exception to the article Stimson wrote after Hiroshima in "Harper's Magazine." He wrote that a "demonstration" of the A-bomb was impossible because we had only two bombs. Had we staged a "demonstration" both bombs might have been duds and then we would have lost face.

Now, this argument is clearly invalid. It is quite true that at the time of Hiroshima we had only two bombs, but it would not have been necessary to wait for very long before we would have had several more.

Q Were you aware then of the attitude of Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard or of the memorandum by Lewis L. Strauss?

A No.

Q So, in effect, there was no concerted opposition to military use of the bomb?

A No, there was none. You see, it would have been impossible for me to go and talk with Lewis Strauss because of the secrecy rules.

Q Do you feel that President Truman and those immediately below him gave full and conscientious study to all the alternatives to use of the atomic bomb?

A I do not think they did. They thought only in terms of our having to end the war by military means.

I don't think Japan would have surrendered unconditionally without the use of force. But there was no need to demand the unconditional surrender of Japan. If we had offered Japan the kind of peace treaty which we actually gave her, we could have had a negotiated peace.

Q In retrospect, do you think your views got a full hearing?

A Let me answer this by describing in detail just what kind of hearing my views got.

In March, 1945, I prepared a memorandum which was meant to be presented to President Roosevelt. This memorandum warned that the use of the bomb against the cities of Japan would start an atomic-arms race with Russia, and it raised the question whether avoiding such an arms race might not be more important than the short-term goal of knocking Japan out of the war. I was not certain that this memorandum would reach the President if I sent it "through channels." Therefore, I asked to see Mrs. Roosevelt, and I intended to transmit my memorandum through her - in a sealed envelope - to the President.

When Mrs. Roosevelt set the date for the interview which I had requested, I went to see Arthur H. Compton, who was in charge of the Chicago project. I rather expected him to object to the contents of my memorandum, and I was therefore much relieved when he told me that he hoped I would get the memorandum into the hands of the President and that it would receive the attention of the President. I then went back to my own office, and I hadn't been there for more than five minutes when there was a knock at the door and there stood Dr. Norman Hilberry. "We have just heard over the radio that President Roosevelt died," he said.

For a while I was at a loss to know how to bring my memorandum to President Truman's attention. I knew many people who knew Roosevelt, but President Truman didn't seem to move in the same circles. Then it occurred to me that we must have several men from Kansas City in the project and that some of these might know how to reach Truman.

When I was asked to go to the White House and see Matt Connelly, Truman's Appointments Secretary, I suggested to Walter Bartky, associate director of our project, that he accompany me. Mr. Connelly read my memorandum with attention. "I can see that this is serious business," he said. "Frankly, at first I was a little suspicious because this appointment came through Kansas City." He told us that the President had an inkling of what our business might be and that he wanted us to go to Spartanburg and see James Byrnes. We didn't know why we were sent to see Byrnes, since at that point Byrnes held no Government position. We were quite willing to go, of course, and we asked for permission to take [atomic scientist] H. C. Urey along. On May 27 we took the night train to Spartanburg.

Q What happened then?

A Having read the memorandum, the first thing that Byrnes told us was that General Groves [head of the Manhattan District, which developed the A-bomb] had informed him that Russia had no uranium. Of course, if Russia did not have any uranium then she would not be able to participate in an atomic-arms race, but to me this seemed to be an exceedingly unlikely assumption. It was conceivable that Russia might have no high-grade uranium-ore deposits - deposits of pitchblende. The only known pitchblende deposit within the control of Russia was the deposit in Czechoslovakia, and this was not believed to be very extensive. But I found it difficult to believe that within the vast expanse of Russia there should be no low-grade uranium-ore deposits which could be used to obtain uranium for the production of bombs.

When I saw Mr. Byrnes I was very much concerned about the fact that no governmental policy had been developed on the issue of how to cope with the problem that the bomb would pose to the world. I raised the question of whether it might be wise to gain time for developing such a governmental policy by postponing the testing of the bomb. It seemed to me that once the bomb had been tested its existence could not be kept secret for long. Byrnes did not think that postponing the test was a good idea, and, in retrospect, I am inclined to agree with him. In retrospect, I don't think that postponing the test would have solved our problem.

Byrnes was concerned about Russia's having taken over Poland, Rumania and Hungary, and so was I. Byrnes thought that the possession of the bomb by America would render the Russians more manageable in Europe. I failed to see how sitting on a stockpile of bombs, which in the circumstances we could not possibly use, would have this effect, and I thought it even conceivable that it would have just the opposite effect.

When I returned to Chicago and learned that Byrnes had been appointed Secretary of State, I concluded that the arguments that I regarded as important would receive no consideration. I didn't realize at that time that Secretary Stimson would play a major role in the final decision and that he might be able to understand my point of view better than Mr. Byrnes had done.

In Chicago I collaborated in the writing of the so-called Franck Report. This report was addressed to Secretary Stimson, but none of those who participated in the writing of the report, including Prof. James Franck, had an opportunity to see Mr. Stimson.

In the meantime I drafted a petition to the President which did not go into any considerations of expediency but opposed, on purely moral grounds, the use of atomic bombs against the cities of Japan. This petition was signed by about 60 members of the Chicago project. Some of those who signed insisted that the petition be transmitted to the President through "official channels." To this I reluctantly agreed. I was, at this point, mainly concerned that the members of the project had an...

Dallo studio sulla decisione di bombardare Hiroshima di Gar Alperovitz.

A Guide To Gar Alperovitz's
THE DECISION TO USE THE ATOMIC BOMB:
PART III
(from materials released at the time of publication)


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


ON HOW VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE "MYTH" WERE CREATED--



PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN

(Partial listing:
See Chapters 41-45 for an extended discussion)

President Truman actively suppressed portions of his journal which suggested his awareness that the war appeared likely to end once Russia attacked.
It had previously been thought the journal was simply misfiled. However, new evidence shows that the President personally directed that it be kept under wraps:


The journal was held by the widow of the President's former press secretary, Charlie Ross, and at Truman's request was kept locked in her safe deposit box. It was kept even from White House aide Eben Ayers, who had been expressly directed by the President to prepare an account for him of the atomic bomb decision during the Potsdam Conference. (See pp. 554-555, Chapter 44)
A letter to the president from Mrs. Ross dated October 16, 1951, explains:


Over the phone yesterday . . . Mr. Ayers asked [about] any notes he [Charlie Ross] may have had on the atomic bomb explosion. There is one envelope of notes marked "Private and Confidential," a typed copy of some personal notes of your own of the Potsdam trip you had loaned him. He had these typed from your own notes by his secretary . . . and--so the accompanying note says--returned the original to you. Part of it is in diary form.
Also, as you may recall, I still have where he placed it in our safety deposit box, the story Charlie wrote--while it was fresh in his mind -- of the decision to use the bomb. (See p. 554, Chapter 44)

The next day, October 17, 1951, Truman replied:


I think you had better keep those private papers of Charlie's in the safety deposit vault because I am sure we have all the information that was contained in them. (See pp. 554-555, Chapter 44)
Truman told Ayers "to drop the matter as far as Mrs. Ross is concerned." (See p. 555, Chapter 44)

(As noted, the journal--made public in 1979--shows that after Stalin confirmed Russia would join the war Truman wrote: "Most of the big points are settled. He'll be in the Jap War on August 15. Fini Japs when that comes about.") (See above; see pp. 241-242, Chapter 19)


Other evidence of the President's effort to keep information secret is abundant. (See pp. 543-561, Chapter 44)
- For instance, Ayers later also recalled:


He [Truman] had in his own office, or more properly, the office of his secretary, Miss Rose Conway, personal files which I do not believe were accessible to or seen by anyone other than Miss Conway and the President. I know that in my work on the President's papers, during 1951 and 1952, I found it practically impossible to get from Miss Conway anything from these files for my use, despite the President's having assured me that everything was to be available to me. (See pp. 548-549, Chapter 44)
- Samuel I. Rosenman, Truman's close friend and counsel, expressed real concern (in an oral history interview conducted for the Library) that Truman would not get the historical recognition he deserved because--as late as 1969--


so many of his papers have not been made available. I don't agree with that. He has kept them under his own supervision. . . . (See p. 552, Chapter 44)

President Truman repeatedly mis-stated well documented facts concerning casualty estimates, the nature of the target (civilian versus military), and advice he was given by military leaders.

On casualties he gave various estimates on various occasions:
- On August 9, 1945 he stated to "the men and women of the Manhattan Project":


Atomic bombs have now been successfully employed against the enemy.
A grateful nation, hopeful that this new weapon will result in the saving of thousands of American lives, feels a deep sense of appreciation for your accomplishment. (See p. 515, Chapter 42)

- To the annual Gridiron Dinner on December 15, 1945 he explained that at the time he made the decision to use the atomic bomb:


It occurred to me that a quarter of a million of the flower of our young manhood was worth a couple of Japanese cities, and I still think they were and are. (See p. 516, Chapter 42)
- On April 6, 1949 the president told a group of new Democratic senators and representatives that he


made that decision because I thought 200,000 of our young men would be saved by making that decision, and some 3[00,000] or 400,000 of the enemy would be saved by making that decision. (See p. 516, Chapter 42)
- On April 28, 1959 Truman told students at Columbia University simply that "the dropping of the bombs stopped the war, saved millions of lives." (See p. 517, Chapter 42; emphasis added above and below for clarity.)


Truman also helped invent numbers "for the record":

In 1952 Thomas L. Cate, a scholar helping to prepare the official history of the Air Force in World War II, wrote Truman to ask about the decision to use the atomic bomb. Truman's initial thought--and his idea of what to tell Cate--was set down in a handwritten draft response dated December 31, 1952:

I asked Gen. Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokio plane [sic] and other places in Japan. It was his opinion that 1/4 million casualties would be the minimum cost as well as an equal number of the enemy. The other military and naval men present agreed. (See p. 517, Chapter 42)
As he reworked the draft, a White House aide, Kenneth W. Hechler, noticed a problem with the response: Truman's estimate of "1/4 million casualties" was considerably different from an (unsubstantiated) "over a million casualties" estimate previously published by Secretary of War Stimson in a 1947 Harper's article and repeated in his memoirs. (See p. 518, Chapter 42; p. 466, Chapter 38) Hechler brought the problem to the attention of another White House aide, David D. Lloyd, in a January 2, 1953, memorandum:


On page 2, it is stated: "I asked Gen. Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokio plane [sic] and other places in Japan. It was his opinion that 1/4 million casualties would be the minimum cost as well as an equal number of the enemy." Stimson says in his book On Active Service, p. 619: "We estimated that if we should be forced to carry this plan to its conclusion, the major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest. I was informed that such operations might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone." I think it is important that the President's casualty figure be changed to conform with that of Secretary Stimson, because presumably Stimson got his from Gen. Marshall; the size of the figure is very important. (See pp. 517-518, Chapter 42)
Lloyd promptly prepared a memorandum to Truman on the basis of Hechler's observations which pointed out:


In your draft, you state that General Marshall told you that a landing in Japan would cost a quarter of a million casualties to the United States, and an equal number of the enemy. Mr. Stimson, in his book written by McGeorge Bundy, says that Marshall's estimate was over a million casualties. Your recollection sounds more reasonable than Stimson's, but in order to avoid a conflict, I have changed the wording to read that General Marshall expected a minimum of a quarter of a million casualties and probably a much greater number -- as much as a million. (See p. 518, Chapter 42)
Although neither Hechler nor Lloyd seem to have bothered to check any actual records of casualty estimates ("your recollection sounds more reasonable")--and although Stimson's estimate had no documentary basis whatsoever (see below, pp. 23-24)--Truman approved Lloyd's revision as if it were historical fact.

A photostatic copy of the final version of the president's letter was reproduced and published as an authoritative source in the official U.S. Army Air Forces history. (See pp. 517-518, Chapter 42)


In this letter, too, the President attempted to explain how its was that the order to use the atomic bomb was issued on July 25--before Japan responded to the Potsdam Proclamation--even though he repeatedly claimed the decision was made only after Tokyo's response was received on July 28. (See pp. 543-548, Chapter 44)

On why Hiroshima was targeted: President Truman offered various reasons which are not supported by the evidence now available:
- In a December 31, 1946 letter to Secretary Stimson the president wrote:


If you will remember our conversation in Potsdam, we came to the conclusion that the bomb should be dropped on a town which was engaged almost exclusively in war work. Hiroshima was the town picked out and then Nagasaki was the second one. (See p. 522, Chapter 42)
(Neither city was deemed important--or targetted--because it was a war production center.) (See above pp. 14-15)

- In Mr. President, a 1952 book prepared by his journalist friend William Hillman, he stated:


I . . . asked Stimson to indicate on the map what cities the military would favor as targets, if Japan did not surrender, and we had to use the bomb. Among the targets was Hiroshima, an army center and military supply port; and, Nagasaki, a major seaport...

Si tranquillizzi, Buffagni, conosco bene tutto, Russell, Alperovitz, la propaganda antiamericana e il resto.
In questo caso, però, sarebbe bene disinformarsi perché la risposta alla storia dei "trionfalisti illogici" non è di sicuro la storia dei "revisionisti ideologici".
Un bel testo, in proposito, è "The Unfinished Nation" di Alan Brinkley, molto equilibrato.
Non credo che sia chiaro un concetto fondamentale: chi fa storiografia con fini morali fa cattiva storiografia.
La storia dell'uomo è una lunga zona grigia, cercare il bianco e il nero è non solo velleitario ma stupido e spesso frutto di malafede ideologica. A me non interessa sapere se gli americani sono i buoni o i cattivi (è ridicolo solo pensare di usare certi parametri), io so solo che, se fossi vissuto ai tempi della seconda guerra mondiale, sarei stato dalla loro parte perché, a prescindere da ogni altra considerazione, contribuire a debellare fascismo, nazismo e imperialismo nipponico sarebbe stato per me un onore e un dovere.

Bernardo

Se permette amico mio mi guardo bene dal lasciare stare lo Spirito proprio perchè è una cosa seria. Le consiglio di fare altrettanto e credo che contribuirebbe a smantellare la corazza ideologica che si è costruito. Il suo ultimo intervento mi conferma nell'idea che lei ha accumulato dati senza (mi scusi se insisto) avere un criterio per una loro interpretazione. Segno inequivocabile di ciò è la sua tendenza a censurare parte dei contributi.
Più di una volta mi capita di leggere autori di cui non condivido assolutamente le idee, scrivere articoli su giornali che detesto cose assolutamente vere. O comunque spunti per una messa in discussione personale e per un approfondimento.
Mi rendo conto che questo richiede coraggio e francamente lei non dimostra averne.

Yusuf

Che vuole farci? Di uomini come lei, Yusuf, non se ne fanno più: hanno buttato lo stampo. E d'altra parte noi giovani di oggi siamo tutti maleducati. ;.)

Saluti,

Bernardo

Ritornando al post dell'amico GdC mi permetto di aggiungere a questa lista anche i costi in termini di conseguenze politiche e sociali. Non solo in Iraq , ma a livello internazionale. Tanto per fare un esempio di cambio di posizione "culturale" : si è arrivati a giustificare la tortura come metodo normale di battaglia contro il "terrorismo", mentre la civiltà europea riconosce che anche il nemico - fosse anche il musulmano - ha diritto alla giustizia e alla dignità.

Yusuf

Grazie a Bernardo. Visto che "conosce bene tutto,"non mi dilungo. Le faccio notare un paio di cose sole (una non può conoscerla, perchè è mia personale).
1) Non sono fascista, nazista, comunista, revisionista. Mio padre ha comandato un reparto partigiano agli ordini del generale Raffaele Cadorna. Spero che al posto suo, avrei fatto lo stesso. Gli capitò anche di far fucilare un suo compagno di corso ufficiali che all'8 settembre aveva fatto la scelta contraria per ragioni di onore militare (antenere la parola data all'avversario). Ne hanno parlato. Mio padre in segno di rispetto gli ha lasciato comandare il plotone d'esecuzione, e gli ha somministrato personalmente il colpo di grazia. Mi ha detto che non ci ha perso una notte di sonno.
Come vede, è possibilissimo rispettare e onorare un nemico che non ci si perita di uccidere.
2) Dalla fine della II guerra mondiale sono passati sessantuno anni. Proprio perchè non ci sono popoli buoni o cattivi, il giudizio sul ruolo attuale degli USA, e su quale relazione Italia ed Europa dovrebbero stabilire con loro, va portato analizzando l'oggi.
Lei l'analizza diversamente da me, e può darsi abbia ragione. Personalmente, ritengo che senza una riaffermazione di indipendenza dagli USA, Italia ed Europa resteranno spiritualmente morte: un'espressione geografica, come disse crudelmente il principe Metternich del nostro paese.
Posso aver torto, ma questo non fa di me, o di chi la pensa come me, un nazista, le pare? Ad esempio, non affibbierei questa etichetta al generale de Gaulle.
Suggerirei di togliere tutte le etichette, e di guardare i contenuti.
Cordialmente, RB

Caro Buffagni, io non l'ho chiamata né nazista, né fascista né in altro modo. Ho solo detto che conoscevo bene quanto da lei riportato, suggerendo sull'argomento un testo equibrato perché non schierato da una parte o dall'altra. D'altro canto che esista lo storicismo etico, l'uso della storia, anzi direi meglio della ricostruzione storiografica, a fini ideologici e politici, lo sa meglio di me. Tutto qui.
Per quanto riguarda gli Stati Uniti, io, che pure sono ben lontano dall'abbracciare entusiasticamente la cultura americana tout court (dicono che sono l'uomo dei "distinguo", si figuri), ritengo che, essendo velleitaria l'idea di un'Europa nazione, la "causa" prioritaria di oggi è quella globale dell'Occidente minacciato dalla crescita economica dei colossi asiatici, dal nichilismo e dai tanti pensieri deboli che si ostina a esprimere senza soluzione di continuità e, infine, dal fondamentalismo islamico sostenuto dalla crescita demografica e dall'immigrazione.
L'Occidente è uno, distinguere tra tra le due sponde dell'Atlantico è "vecchio", così come inadeguato è il riferimento a De Gaulle, di sicuro soldato valoroso e coraggioso, ma certamente anche uomo politico rivolto a un passato che già ai suoi tempi poteva ben dirsi morto e sepolto.
O l'Occidente si salva tutto o non si salva: questo io credo.
E la salvezza passa innanzitutto per la riscoperta delle radici culturali, per il recupero di un'etica virtuosamente deontologica, per la sobrietà cristiana e cartesiana opposta al cinismo svaccato del kitsch. Tutto questo valorizzerebbe e renderebbe più forti le conquiste di libertà e democrazia che sono il nostro patrimonio comune, di europei e di americani. Ecco perché il mio impegno è tutto in direzione di una cultura della libertà che faccia fruttificare in senso virtuoso quel terreno comune. Non si tratta di distinguerci dagli Stati Uniti ma di mettere insieme gli uomini migliori, le menti più brillanti, la società sana di entrambi i continenti al servizio della grande causa occidentale.
Mai e poi mai, però, terrò lo strascico a chi per moralismo o per ideologia prende le distanze da questo Occidente "globale" che ho appena descritto fino a concepire addirittura anche una minima contiguità con le "ragioni" di Bin Laden, col ribrezzo islamico per la democrazia e per la libertà (e non per i suoi "eccessi" come si è soliti dire, perché una teocrazia non è affatto più "morale" dell'Olanda libertina, e la battaglia etica non può identificarsi semplicisticamente e coranicamente con una questione giuridica).
Non è un caso che proprio il probabile erede politico del gollismo, l'attuale ministro dell'interno francese Nicolas Sarkozy, dice e scrive più o meno le stesse cose che, ben più modestamente, dice e scrive il sottoscritto.

Bernardo

La ringrazio della cortese e articolata risposta. Non mi è possibile risponderle con la stessa ampiezza, e me ne scuso.
Molto in fretta: non credo che esista, al di fuori della propaganda, la realtà culturale e politica etichettata "Occidente".
Ritengo che l'egemonia USA ci faccia assai male, vada contrastata.
Non ho idea se l'Europa, e l'Italia in quella, ci riuscirà, perchè non ho la palla di cristallo.
A giudicare da come stiamo messi ora, non è tanto probabile. Per fortuna, la storia è imprevedibile, e il sistema politico USA non è in buona salute.
Non condivido il suo apprezzamento di Sarkozy. Quanto al generale de Gaulle, pagherei volentieri molto caro un politico italiano che valesse un trecentesimo del generale. In realtà, trovo la politica di dG lungimirante, e della massima attualità (la "globalizzazione" non è un evento atmosferico, è una politica imperiale USA, come fu una politica imperiale britannica la sua antenata sette-ottocentesca, e l'unica difesa contro questo attacco sono proprio le patrie, i popoli e le nazioni, come fece notare il generale).
Per farla molto corta, a me stanno a cuore l'indipendenza e la sovranità del nostro paese. Non abbiamo nè l'una nè l'altra, e quel ch'è peggio, non pensiamo nè l'una nè l'altra. Evitando di assumerci la responsabilità di pensare indipendenza e sovranità, andiamo alla deriva, e la nostra cultura di putrefa (cinismo & frivolezza).
Cordialmente, RB